



**General Assembly
Security Council**

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**General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism**

**Security Council
Fifty-sixth year**

**Letter dated 18 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative
of Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a communication from Mr. Aleksandr Lukashenko, President of the Republic of Belarus, addressed to you (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Sergei Ling**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Belarus
to the United Nations



Annex to the letter dated 18 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The President of the Republic of Belarus

Minsk, 8 October 2001

The Republic of Belarus welcomes the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1373 (2001) on combating terrorism. We fully and unconditionally support that decision and consider the measures set forth in the resolution to be exceptionally important and timely.

International terrorism is a terrible evil. It has to be dealt with firmly and consistently. However, terrorism cannot be overcome merely through the use of force, particularly on a unilateral basis. What is required is integrated and coordinated action by the entire world community.

The Republic of Belarus has always had high regard for the activities of the United Nations in addressing the problems of international terrorism. Under the new circumstances, the role of the United Nations in bringing together the efforts of all States to combat terrorism has significantly grown. It is only through the utilization of the unique potential of the United Nations, particularly in eradicating the conditions that give rise to and support terrorism, that tangible success in that effort can be achieved. We consider that the United Nations should play the central role in devising the strategy and tactics of the international community for counteracting terrorism.

Many of the provisions of the resolution have long been put into practice by State bodies in the Republic of Belarus.

On my instructions, a careful check is being carried out in the banking institutions of the country to identify any financial assets or other resources belonging to persons or organizations that might be directly or indirectly linked to terrorist activity. In the event that any such resources or assets are discovered, they will be immediately frozen.

A special meeting of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus will be held in the next few days in order to devise a set of additional measures to combat terrorism.

The fact that Belarus has acceded to and ratified most of the 12 United Nations anti-terrorist conventions and its active participation in all United Nations bodies that are addressing that problem are evidence of the consistent policy followed by the Republic of Belarus.

The Republic of Belarus is actively cooperating with interested States, and is willing to expand its collaboration, in exchanging information that may be conducive to the prevention and suppression of terrorist acts.

I trust that, through its joint efforts, the world community will be able to achieve tangible results in combating this new and dangerous threat to civilization.

(Signed) Aleksandr Lukashenko

**Security Council**

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22 October 2001

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**Letter dated 22 October 2001 from the Permanent Representatives
of Mali and Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council**

We have the honour to inform you that an urgent meeting of the Islamic Group was held today at the ambassadorial level to consider the grave and deteriorating situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, as a result of Israel's escalation of military action against the Palestinian people and its reoccupation of Palestinian cities and towns.

On behalf of the Member States of the Islamic Group, we have the honour to request the convening of an immediate meeting of the Security Council in order to take the necessary action to ensure the full and immediate withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from Palestinian areas it has reoccupied recently.

(Signed) **Moctar Ouane**
Ambassador

Permanent Representative of the Republic of Mali
Chairman of the Islamic Group

(Signed) **Nassir Abdulaziz Al-Nasser**
Ambassador

Permanent Representative of the State of Qatar,
representing the Chairman of the Ninth Islamic Summit Conference





Security Council

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Letter dated 23 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the position expressed by my Government at the end of the work in Addis Ababa on the national dialogue (see annex).

My Government would be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ileka Atoki
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 23 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Position of the Congolese Government at the end of the work in Addis Ababa on the national dialogue

Kinshasa, Saturday, 20 October 2001

1. You will recall that, within the framework of the national dialogue process, the facilitator organized in Gaborone (Botswana) a preparatory committee, which consisted of 70 delegates from the five component groups provided for under the Lusaka Accord.

2. Those meetings, the success of which was recognized by the entire world, adopted the following resolutions:

- The national dialogue was to be held in Addis Ababa beginning on 15 October 2001.
- The national dialogue was to be **inclusive in nature**. To this end, it was to be composed of **320 participants** and was to be opened to certain major social and political groups, whose specific representation was to be organized by the facilitator. This relates to the RCD/ML, the Mai-Mai and the religious denominations.
- A recommendation was made that the political opposition component should better balance its representation and that all component groups should take account of their representation of women.
- The draft agenda and the draft rules of procedure drawn up at the Gaborone meetings were to be submitted to the plenary meeting of the national dialogue for adoption.

3. On 15 October in Addis Ababa, it was noted that the facilitator had not been able to bring together either the 320 delegates expected or the representatives of the groups referred to. Their participation, however, was needed to guarantee the inclusive nature of the national dialogue.

4. In his opening statement, the facilitator suggested that the lack of financial means at his disposal was the reason for this situation.

5. The facilitator then proposed that the work of the national dialogue should begin with the 70 persons present in Addis Ababa, whereas the other participants would join the dialogue as donors provided funds for the facilitation work.

6. The Government pointed out that such a step was irrational and unusual for meetings of that type since the agenda items adopted by the initial nucleus could be brought into question each time a group would come to join the initial group.

There was thus a risk of beginning work again each time new groups of delegates came to Addis Ababa as a result of an increase in the financial means at the disposal of the facilitator.

7. Certain component groups, particularly the RCD, the MLC and a part of the political opposition, having acknowledged the correctness of the Government's position, then proposed that the 70 delegates who were present in Addis Ababa and who had participated in the work of the preparatory committee in Gaborone, should replace the plenary group for the national dialogue and begin work immediately.

8. The Government pointed out that that proposal violated the spirit and letter of the Lusaka Accord and the resolutions adopted at the meetings in Gaborone, which stipulated that *the dialogue must be inclusive* and therefore should include the representatives of all the social and political *forces vives* in order to prevent those resolutions from being called into question subsequently. The Government also asked how a preparatory committee could be transformed into a plenary assembly.

The Government lastly underscored that the political crisis that had been affecting our country for several years was due to the fact that it was difficult for Congolese politicians to agree on the rules to be followed and when they did agree they were unable to respect them.

How could one agree that the resolutions adopted by consensus in Gaborone two months earlier should be reconsidered by the very same persons who had drawn them up? Did that not portend a danger which could only serve to threaten the agreed implementation of the resolutions and other decisions which should result from the national dialogue?

For the Government, therefore, it was out of the question to hold a dialogue that was of little worth or was conducted under any possible conditions.

It was time for the Congolese politicians to begin to respect their commitments by respecting themselves and the Congolese people.

The dialogue, therefore, was to take place under the conditions defined in Gaborone, that is, with the 320 delegates as well as the representatives of the groups identified by consensus in Gaborone.

9. **The facilitator then announced that the objective and important problem raised by the Government could be solved within the framework of the proposal of South Africa, which was prepared to host the national dialogue within one month by assuming the major share of the expenses involved.**

10. *The Government and all the other component groups responded positively to this proposal.* It made it possible to put an end to a sterile debate and to respond to the expectations of the population and all the component groups by bringing together the 320 delegates provided for in Gabarone as well as the RCD/ML representatives, the Maï-Maï and the religious denominations.

11. The RCD, the MLC and a part of the political opposition then proposed making use of the presence of the 70 delegates from Gabarone in Addis Ababa in order to begin consideration of the agenda items and the rules of procedure for the dialogue. The facilitator supported that point of view, arguing that it might be difficult for him to explain to the international community that he had made some 100 persons travel to Addis Ababa for one week for nothing.

12. The Government, for its part, recalled that, in Gabarone, the 70 delegates present in Addis Ababa had already had the opportunity to draw up the draft agenda as well as the draft rules of procedure which the plenary meeting of the dialogue

was to consider for definitive adoption after making adjustments. There was no valid reason, therefore, for the same 70 delegates to resume work, in Addis Ababa, that they had already completed in Gabarone, particularly in view of the fact that the 320 delegates to the inclusive dialogue in South Africa would in any event again take up the draft agenda and the draft rules of procedure.

13. The Government, therefore, recommended that the facilitator should save resources by suspending the first phase of the dialogue, which had taken place in Addis Ababa, and make use of the period of time between the meetings in Addis Ababa and South Africa in order to solve the outstanding problems concerning the representation of the Mai-Mai, the religious denominations and the RCD dissident factions. He should also bring about a solution to the problems relating to the representation of the internal and external political opposition, many of whom feel excluded from the next national dialogue.

As the guarantor of peace and national unity, which distinguishes it from the other component groups in the dialogue, *the Government must ensure the involvement of all social and political sectors in the national dialogue* in order to prevent that forum, from the outset, from sowing the seeds of disputes contesting its resolutions because of the exclusion or marginalization of certain social and political forces.

14. The Government also wished to console the facilitator by showing him that the meetings in Addis Ababa would not be pointless since they would make it possible to:

- Bring together the representatives of all the component groups provided for in the national dialogue;
- Begin the work of the dialogue on the date scheduled;
- Reaffirm the will of the Congolese to conduct a dialogue for peace and national unity;
- Provide a new framework for the dialogue in order to ensure a successful outcome.

15. For these reasons, the Government decided to participate in the meeting convened on Friday, 19 October 2001, during which it had the opportunity to explain its position to the facilitator and the other component groups before withdrawing in order to devote itself to the preparation of the second phase of the national dialogue, which will take place in South Africa in the next few days.

16. Notwithstanding the stand taken by the Government, the suspension of the work of the meetings in Addis Ababa was inevitable in view of the precarious financial situation affecting the facilitation work, as demonstrated by the formal notice given by the facilitator to all the delegates, terminating their financial support on 20 October 2001.

17. In light of what occurred in Addis Ababa, it is clearly apparent that the Government remained respectful of the commitments undertaken in Gabarone and intends to continue the process of the national dialogue that began in Addis Ababa on 15 October 2001.



Security Council

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Letter dated 23 October 2001 from the President of the Security Council to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning Counter-Terrorism

On behalf of the members of the Security Council, I should like to welcome your letter dated 19 October 2001 (S/2001/986), transmitting the work programme of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, pursuant to paragraph 7 of resolution 1373 (2001). The members of the Security Council today agreed to the work programme as submitted by you.

(Signed) Richard Ryan
President of the Security Council



**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
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**General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East
Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied
Palestinian Territory****Security Council
Fifty-sixth year****Letter dated 23 October 2001 from the Chairman of the
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People addressed to the Secretary-General**

In my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, I would like to draw your kind attention, again as a matter of urgency, to the worsening of the security situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem.

Our Committee has been greatly alarmed by the latest deterioration of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. As you are aware, in the course of the past several days, the Israel Defense Forces have conducted a series of incursions into a number of Palestinian-controlled areas, contributing significantly to the escalation of the crisis. This large-scale operation, mounted ostensibly for security reasons, was supported by tanks, armoured personnel carriers and army bulldozers. As a result of shelling and gunfire from the Israel Defense Forces, more than 20 innocent Palestinian civilians, including children, lost their lives throughout the Palestinian Territory — in Bethlehem, Beit Jala, El-Bireh, Jenin, Qalqilya, Nablus, Ramallah, Tulkarm and the Gaza Strip. Many civilians have received injuries, some of them severe. In Bethlehem, churches, two hospitals, including a maternity hospital, and an orphanage came under fire. In addition, acts of settler vandalism were reported in a Hebron mosque. Classes at some 85 Palestinian schools have been suspended because of the Israeli incursions and blockade. In all, the Israel Defense Forces have reoccupied six Palestinian cities. What is particularly disquieting about these recent actions is the stated Israeli intention to expand the scope of the operations and reoccupy other "A" Areas.

The Committee considers the reoccupation by the Israel Defense Forces of the areas under full Palestinian control as yet another glaring and unequivocal illustration of Israel's lack of respect for the bilateral agreements signed to date. By occupying areas under the full control of the Palestinian Authority, creating facts on the ground, carrying out extrajudicial assassinations and destroying Palestinian houses and other property, Israel is inflicting great suffering on the Palestinian



people and is doing irreparable damage to the principles and foundations of the peace process.

In the light of the above, our Committee calls upon Israel to withdraw its forces from all areas under Palestinian control immediately and refrain from undertaking such incursions in the future. The recent escalation of violence proves time and again that the heart of the problem is the continuing illegal occupation by Israel of the Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. The occupying Power must heed the calls of the international community and respect the principles of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, and the provisions of all relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. In addition, as the present conflict has a potential for widening, the Security Council should discharge its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, conferred upon it by the Member States under the Charter of the United Nations and act decisively in order to prevent further bloodshed and destruction.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Tenth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Papa Louis Fall
Chairman
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights
of the Palestinian People



Security Council

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24 October 2001

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**Letter dated 23 October 2001 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 19 October 2001, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. Annan



Annex

**Letter dated 19 October 2001 from the Secretary-General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Secretary-General**

In accordance with Security Council resolution 1088, I attach the monthly report on SFOR operations (see enclosure). I would appreciate your making this report available to the Security Council.

(Signed) George Robertson

Enclosure**Monthly report to the Security Council on the operations of the Stabilization Force**

1. Over the reporting period (1 to 30 September 2001), there were just over 19,500 troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with contributions from all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies and from 15 non-NATO countries.
2. During the period under review, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained relatively calm. SFOR continued its mission to ensure a safe and secure environment throughout the area.
3. Some violent incidents did take place, including the destruction of the car belonging to the Serb mayor Serbsko Orasje, which was blown up by a bomb in what is believed to have been a politically motivated act; a grenade attack which damaged a Bosniac bakery in Doboj; and a grenade explosion under a car in Gacko which injured two people.
4. SFOR monitored the public school integration process involving Bosniac and Bosnian Serb students in the Brcko district. School started for 7,000 primary and 3,200 high school pupils on 3 September. No incidents were reported.
5. SFOR troops continued to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations using ground and air patrols. Other operations included providing area security, monitoring the Entity Armed Forces, conducting weapons storage site inspections, providing support to the international organizations in theatre, and collecting weapons and ammunition in the framework of Operation Harvest.
6. SFOR also prepared contingency plans in case of any terrorist incidents following the attacks on the United States on 11 September and, during a two-day period from 28 to 30 September, increased search operations in the area of Visoko. As a result, some individuals were detained and weapons confiscated.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

7. The situation in theatre remained relatively calm throughout the reporting period, with the entities in substantial compliance with the military provisions of the Peace Agreement.
8. Inspection and verification of weapons storage sites continues to be one of SFOR's priority tasks. The Bosnian Croat component of the Federation Army has now resumed its normal activities. Responsibility for the weapons storage sites guarded by SFOR since spring 2001 was handed back to the Bosnian Croat component of the Federation Army during this reporting period. On 3 September, the Multi-National Division (South) began relocating weapons and ammunition from Republika Srpska and Bosnian Serb Army weapons storage sites which did not conform to safety measures for storing ammunition and explosives.
9. During the period under review, SFOR troops conducted 77 weapons storage site inspections: 19 Bosnian Serb; 26 Bosniac; 13 Bosnian Croat; and 19 Federation. On 12 September, SFOR discovered a bunker belonging to the Bosnian Serbs near Han Pijesak in Multi-National Division (North) and confiscated a small amount of ammunition.

10. SFOR troops monitored 250 training and movement activities during the reporting period: 68 Bosnian Serb, 114 Bosniac, 10 Bosnian Croat and 58 Federation.

11. Over the period, a total of 706 mine-clearing activities were monitored: 231 Bosnian Serb, 252 Bosniac, 95 Bosnian Croat, 123 Federation and 5 Federation Army Department.

Cooperation with international organizations

12. Within capabilities and in accordance with its mandate, SFOR continues to provide assistance to the international organizations in theatre, including the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the International Police Task Force, the Office of the High Representative, the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

13. SFOR continues to support the efforts of the Office of the High Representative to establish common institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to protect the Administrator of the Office during her auditing activities at the Herzegovacka Banka in Mostar. With regard to assistance to the Office in opening up airfields, Bosnia and Herzegovina resumed control of lower and middle airspace on 14 September, and was granted authority by SFOR to negotiate the use of higher airspace with the international organizations concerned.

14. SFOR supported local police and the International Police Task Force during religious ceremonies in several locations, including Bugojno on 14 September involving 10,000 people, Otaka (Sarajevo) on 22 September involving 4,000 people, and Jelic on 29 September involving 1,000 people, as well as during a reburial ceremony in Visegrad on 29 September attended by more than 400 people. All these events took place peacefully.

15. SFOR provided a safe and secure environment in support of the work of the Tribunal in areas near Ozren-Podcjelovo, Miljkovac and Cancari during exhumations of mass graves, and in Sarajevo, Foca, Prijedor, Kozarac, Gorazde and Jakarina Kosa, where other remains were discovered.

Displaced persons and refugees

16. SFOR continues to support UNHCR as displaced persons return to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and is reviewing UNHCR plans for the winter. In the first half of the year, 46,802 people returned to their homes, an increase of 80 per cent compared to the same period in 2000. Progress in the return of displaced persons to the Republika Srpska is, however, slower in comparison. On 3 September, several hundred persons demonstrated in front of the UNHCR office in Sarajevo because their homes had still not been reconstructed. There are daily reports of low-level intimidation of Bosniacs who have returned to their homes in the Sepak area in northern Bosnia and Herzegovina, and incidents included damage to property and hand-grenade attacks.

Outlook

17. The overall security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains under control. SFOR is continuing to monitor the situation in Kotorsko near Doboj, where construction on 178 disputed land plots allocated to Bosnian Serbs was ordered to cease by the local municipality following a court ruling.

18. The Government is in the process of putting in place a series of measures to counter any terrorist threat.



Security Council

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Letter dated 23 October 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to convey the attached report on the international security presence in Kosovo covering the period 1 to 30 September 2001.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. Annan



Annex

Monthly report to the United Nations on KFOR operations

1. Over the reporting period (1 to 30 September 2001) there were just over 41,500 KFOR troops in theatre, with no major changes in deployment since the last report.
2. The overall situation in Kosovo during the month of September remained relatively calm. Acts of inter-ethnic violence and intimidation continue to be reported, particularly assaults on Romas by Kosovar Albanians in the Mali Alas area. Some violent acts are believed to be linked to local crime rather than being ethnically or politically motivated. With the approach of winter, illegal logging is taking place and KFOR continues to hand over the individuals involved to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Security

3. During the reporting period, a number of incidents were reported, including bomb threats to the Kosovo electrical company, and damage to two buildings from explosions in Belobrod and Brodosavce in the Multinational Brigade (South), incidents which are believed to be politically motivated. Two off-duty members of the Kosovo Police Service were shot dead while attempting to arrest six cow thieves in Petrovce. One suspect was killed and the other five escaped. A KFOR observation post was surrounded during the night of 16 to 17 September by about 50 Kosovar Albanians carrying torches and throwing rocks. No one was injured, and the crowd dispersed.
4. On 18 September, two Serbian men crossing into Kosovo from Serbia were arrested by KFOR for alleged war crimes. On 28 September, in Koprivnica, one man died when a van with nine Kosovar Serbs inside was fired on. The assailants escaped. On 30 September, a Kosovar Serb woman in Klokot was killed by a booby-trap on the road. Also on 30 September, violence flared up between Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians in the Serb quarter of Orahovac, and six persons were detained following the intervention of KFOR and UNMIK. A similar clash took place in the Serb enclave of Gojdulja earlier in the month.
5. Three small demonstrations have taken place protesting against the 1,300 Serbs missing in Kosovo. A crowd of 800 demonstrated in Decane against the expulsion of a former Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) commander for non-compliant behaviour and misuse of his position.
6. In Mitrovica, acts of violence and harassment continue to be reported. KFOR and UNMIK police had to intervene on 17 September to prevent a confrontation between Kosovar Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, and in another incident to prevent the abduction of one of KFOR's Albanian interpreters. On 25 September, three unsuccessful grenade attacks on civilian targets were reported: two in Mitrovica and one in Pec.
7. KFOR continues to uncover weapons caches throughout the province. These have included mortars, bomb-making and booby-trap equipment, mines and other explosives. During the current reporting period, 1,978 weapons were destroyed, bringing the total of weapons destroyed under the weapons destruction programme to 9,989.

Border/boundary security

8. KFOR continued its activities along the borders with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia^a and with Albania, and continued to confiscate weapons and to deter and detain persons illegally crossing the borders. The expected mass return of National Liberation Army fighters from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia did not materialize. During the reporting period, weapons and ammunition were found daily, and 263 persons were caught and handed over to the UNMIK police. Some 2,407 weapons, 1,722 grenades and mines and 169,719 rounds of ammunition have been seized since June. In one case, persons attempting to cross the border from Albania exchanged fire with KFOR, and then fled back into Albania. Some of the incidents involving this border included suspected smuggling activities.

9. The number of refugees who have made their way into Kosovo from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia since February is estimated to be 81,821, with an estimated 27,940 remaining within Kosovo.

Air safety zone

10. The air safety zone has been reduced from 25 to 10 kilometres.

UNSCR 1160

11. Although KFOR operations continue to result in weapons seizures, there have been no reported violations of Security Council resolution 1160 (1998).^b

Cooperation and compliance by the Parties

12. With regard to the Kosovo Protection Corps, three cases of non-compliance were reported during September relating to threatening behaviour, unauthorized absence and illegal border crossing. In September, two cases for dismissal relating to absenteeism, lack of discipline and dereliction of guard duty were brought forward, and no cases were closed, leaving 24 cases open. During the months of August and September, a roll-call was conducted throughout the province, resulting in 247 discrepancies.

13. KPC continued to carry out a variety of humanitarian projects throughout the province, with the International Organization for Migration monitoring the projects as well as the funding requirements. The project for the Gjllian sports and recreational ground is continuing under the supervision and support of the Multinational Brigade (East), and involves 30 KPC members.

14. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia security forces remain in general compliance with the terms of the Military Technical Agreement.

^a Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

^b The Security Council, in its resolution 1367 (2001), decided to terminate the prohibitions established by paragraph 8 and decided to dissolve the Committee established by paragraph 9 of its resolution 1160 (1998) relating to the prohibition on arms sales to Yugoslavia.

Cooperation with international organizations

15. KFOR continues to provide daily assistance to international organizations and non-governmental organizations throughout Kosovo, on request, and to provide security assistance in support of UNMIK police operations.

16. KFOR continues to be involved in the preparations in the lead-up to the Assembly elections scheduled for 17 November.

Return of refugees and displaced persons

17. Fourteen of the 83 Kosovar Serbs who resettled in the Osojane Valley in August have returned to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, citing lack of financial support as the reason.

Outlook

18. The security situation in Kosovo continues to be stable. Criminal activity in the province remains one of the major concerns both to UNMIK and to KFOR. As the election date approaches, rising ethnic tension may pose a risk to KFOR personnel.



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
Letter dated 23 October 2001 addressed to the President of the Security Council from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of the members of the Council, a report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

The report was approved by the Committee on 22 October 2001.

(Signed) Ole Peter Kolby
Chairman

Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990)
concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait



Annex

Report of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in accordance with paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines for facilitating full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 approved by Security Council resolution 700 (1991) of 17 June 1991 (S/22660, annex).
2. Under paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines, the Committee is required to report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The last report was approved by the Committee on 20 July 2001. The present report is the forty-second report submitted under the above-mentioned guidelines.
3. By paragraph 12 of the guidelines, all States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may have come to their attention relating to possible violations by other States or foreign nationals of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq. During the period covered by the present report, the Committee received a letter dated 7 September 2001 from the United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations drawing the Committee's attention to some German press articles reporting the alleged Iraqi attempt to develop its weapons of mass destruction programmes. The letter was circulated to all Committee members and the matter is under consideration by the Committee.
4. By paragraphs 13 and 15 of the guidelines, all States and international organizations are required to consult the Committee on the question of whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items which are meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use. During the period under review, the Committee has not been consulted by any State or international organization on questions related to dual-use or multi-use items.
5. By paragraph 14 of the guidelines, international organizations are requested to take all appropriate steps to assist in ensuring full compliance with the arms and related sanctions against Iraq, including providing to the Committee any information of this kind that may come to their attention. During the period of the present report, no such information as requested by paragraph 14 of the guidelines has been brought to the attention of the Committee.
6. The Committee will continue its efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council. Since the last report of the Secretary-General, dated 4 December 1991 (S/22884/Add.2), no further communications have been received from Member States pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991).



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Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 42
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council Fifty-sixth year

Letter dated 23 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you as follows:

Between 1121 and 1236 hours on 30 September 2001 Israeli warplanes, violating Lebanese airspace, overflow the occupied Shab'a farmlands as far as Shikka at high altitudes and circled over the sea in the Bint Jubayl and Naqurah areas.

Between 1552 and 1640 hours on 1 October 2001 Israeli warplanes flew over the sea seven nautical miles off Naqurah heading north and circled between Beirut and Shikka. They also overflew the occupied Shab'a farmlands heading north, thus violating Lebanese airspace.

Between 1115 and 1215 hours on 2 October 2001 Israeli warplanes overflew the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) at high altitudes. They also overflew the towns of Kafr Killa, Bint Jubayl and Yaron and an offshore area west of Naqurah, thus violating Lebanese airspace.


Between 1001 and 1040 hours on 3 October 2001 Israeli warplanes overflew the Biqa', Jubayl, Beirut, Sidon, Damur and Marj Uyun areas.

Between 1130 and 1155 hours Israeli warplanes again flew over an area off Jubayl heading towards Shikka, thus violating Lebanese airspace.

Between 1025 and 1534 hours on 3 October 2001 Israeli warplanes and reconnaissance aircraft overflew the UNIFIL area of operations in 12 sorties at high altitudes, thus violating Lebanese airspace.

Between 1520 and 1610 hours on 3 October 2001 two Israeli warplanes overflew the Bija' and Beirut areas, thus violating Lebanese airspace.

Between 1842 and 1925 hours on 3 October 2001 elements of the Israeli enemy forces deployed at Mughr Shab'a, Jabal al-Summaq and Ruwaysat al-Alam in the Shab'a and Kafr Shuba hills fired 85 artillery shells and mortar and tank



rounds and 80 light-weapons rounds at an area north of UNIFIL observation post 4-31 near the Shab'a gate and an area south-east of UNIFIL observation post 4-14 east of Kafr Shuba. The shelling also targeted Wadi al-Summaq and an area north of Hilta.

Between 2210 and 0100 hours on the night of 3/4 October 2001 an Israeli warplane flew between Khaldah and Damur, thus violating Lebanese airspace.

Between 1200 and 1245 hours on 4 October 2001 Israeli warplanes overflew the UNIFIL area of operations, thus violating Lebanese airspace.

On 22 October 2001 Israeli warplanes carried out an intense bombardment of the Lebanese areas opposite the Shab'a farmlands. Warplanes were used in two attacks on the Kafr Shuba hills, and they fired a number of missiles. The Israeli army also fired some 100 heavy-calibre shells, damaging many dwellings and a great deal of property. The shelling affected Kafr Shuba and cut the road linking Kafr Shuba with Shab'a. Israeli artillery also targeted the outskirts of Kafr Hamam, Bab al-Hawa, Mazra'at Bastarah, Hilta, Shanuh, Jabal Saddanah and Birkat al-Naqqar to the west of Shab'a as well as other nearby Lebanese villages.

The Israeli aerial violations indicated above confirm that Israel is continuing to provoke and threaten Lebanon. They are in flagrant violation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978) and of Lebanon's sovereignty, and they pose a threat to security and stability in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sélim Tadmoury
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
24 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 24 October 2001 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish on behalf of my Government to report to the Security Council on measures that Canada has initiated following the armed attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. Those attacks, which were the subject of Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 and 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, resulted in the deaths of thousands of citizens from many countries, including Canada.

As announced by Canada's Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Jean Chrétien, on 7 October 2001, Canada is deploying naval ships, surveillance and transport airplanes, military personnel and other assets. Our actions are directed against Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida terrorist organization and the Taliban regime that is supporting it. Canada's actions are not directed against the Afghan population or against Islam. Canada is taking these measures in exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. This is further to the notification by the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the invocation by NATO of article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

(Signed) Michel Duval
Ambassador and
Chargé d'affaires a.i.





**General Assembly
Security Council**

Distr.: General
24 October 2001

Original: English

**General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 62
Question of Cyprus**

**Security Council
Fifty-sixth year**

**Letter dated 22 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative
of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General**

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 22 October 2001, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Aytuğ Plümer, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Umit Pamir
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 22 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the statement made by the Greek Cypriot representative at the United Nations under agenda item 10, "Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization", on 25 September 2001 at the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly. Since the Greek Cypriot delegate, purporting to represent the so-called "Republic of Cyprus", has, once again, exploited this international forum, where the Turkish Cypriot side is denied its lawful representation, to make false accusations against the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey, I am compelled to respond to these accusations in writing.

In an attempt to brand the Turkish Cypriot side as the "intransigent" party in the process of talks, the Greek Cypriot representative, in his statement, distorts the position of the Turkish Cypriot side with regard to the talks and your efforts in the context of your good offices mission. As it will be recalled, in your statement of 14 November 1999, in which the commencement of the proximity talks was announced, it was stated that the aim of these talks was to "prepare the ground for meaningful negotiations leading to a comprehensive settlement." It will also be recalled that the Greek Cypriot side's rejection of your statement of 12 September 2000 (SG/SM/7546), made at the opening of the fourth round of proximity talks, eventually led to the breakdown of the proximity talks. In view of the fact that your opening statement basically reiterated a given framework that "the parties share a common desire to bring about, through negotiations in which each represents its side — and no one else — as the political equal of the other, a comprehensive settlement enshrining a new partnership", the Greek Cypriot rejection was alarming. This rejection confirmed the well-known Greek Cypriot position put forward clearly in the statement made by Mr. Glafcos Clerides, the leader of the Greek Cypriot administration, on 2 February 2000, during the second round of the proximity talks, that the aim of the Greek Cypriot side "is not to create a new state but an amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus". It should be recalled that following your opening statement, Mr. Clerides boycotted the proximity talks for days. Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives passed a resolution on 11 October 2000 stating that "the opening statement of the United Nations Secretary-General falls outside the letter and spirit of the framework of the talks" and "calls upon ... a full correction of the situation created by the United Nations Secretary-General's opening statement". This is clearly a rebuff of your mission of good offices.

Rejection of your statement dated 12 September 2000 meant that the Greek Cypriot side rejected even the most basic and given parameters for a settlement in Cyprus, namely, the establishment of a new partnership and the political equality of the two parties. While, on the one hand, the Greek Cypriot side pretends to negotiate for a just and lasting settlement, it rejects, on the other hand, the concept of a new partnership. This shows that the Greek Cypriot side is not sincere about a settlement based on partnership, which has been the aim of the United Nations-sponsored talks from the very beginning. The attempt by the Greek Cypriot representative to present the Turkish Cypriot side's stance on the preparation of the common ground prior to substantial negotiations as "preconditions", is in reality an attempt to conceal the

Greek Cypriot side's lack of support for the creation of a new partnership, hence a viable and just settlement.

Three decades of negotiations have demonstrated that no result can be achieved without first preparing the ground for meaningful and substantive negotiations leading to a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus. In the light of the Greek Cypriot party's rejection of a new partnership on the basis of equality, the insistence of the Turkish Cypriot party on the preparation of a common ground should not be seen as "intransigence" or as "withdrawal from the talks" but rather as an attempt to put the talks, which were derailed by the Greek Cypriot side's lack of goodwill, on the right track.

During your meeting with President Denktas in Salzburg, Austria, on 28 August 2001, it was agreed that Mr. Alvaro de Soto, your Special Adviser on Cyprus, would travel to the island for consultations in order to find a common ground that would pave the way for talks between the two sides. During the meetings Mr. de Soto had with the Turkish Cypriot party, it became apparent that there existed no common ground. Despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriot party tried to impress upon Mr. de Soto that it was premature to invite the two sides for a meeting in New York, and knowing only too well that the Turkish Cypriot side could not attend the talks before the preparation of the ground, Mr. de Soto, at a press conference held on 5 September 2001 prior to his departure from the island, stated that he had extended your invitation to the two sides to resume the negotiations.

It is important to note that, both before and since the end of the process of proximity talks in November 2000, the Turkish Cypriot side has given its support to your good offices mission and has stated that it is ready to work towards establishing a common ground which would lead to substantive negotiations. However, as explained clearly by President Rauf R. Denktas in his letter of 10 September 2001 addressed to you, since the invitation was to "resume the negotiations" and not to prepare the ground, the Turkish Cypriot party could not attend the talks scheduled to start on 12 September in New York. Concrete experience shows that any process started without the ground having been prepared is bound to fail, with dire consequences for prospects for reconciliation.

With regard to the accusation by the Greek Cypriot representative in his statement that Mr. Denktas is "attempting to exploit and deliberately misinterpret the statement of the Secretary-General of 12 September of last year and calls for the creation of a 'new partnership'", I would like to invite the Greek Cypriot representative to read once again the statement of 12 September 2000, which refers, word for word, to the establishment of a "new partnership", and to recognize that the objective of the talks has always been and can only be the establishment of a new partnership. The Turkish Cypriot side did not feel the need to interpret a clear concept such as "new partnership", which can only mean that it will not be the continuation of the so-called "Republic of Cyprus".

The characterization by the Greek Cypriot representative of the confederation proposal of the Turkish Cypriot side as "unacceptable" shows that the Greek Cypriot side will not accept any settlement that would once and for all put an end to the Greek Cypriot aspiration of making Cyprus a Greek state with a Turkish Cypriot "minority". A settlement on the basis of the sovereign equality of the two parties will prevent the repetition of the 1963-1974 period, during which the Turkish Cypriot people were persecuted and oppressed while the Greek Cypriot side was

able to usurp the title of the partnership Republic of Cyprus by force of arms. The Turkish Cypriot side believes that if the Greek Cypriot administration's aspiration to Hellenize the island no longer exists, then the Greek Cypriot side would have no valid reason to reject a partnership.

With regard to the reference by the Greek Cypriot representative to the alleged "invasion" and "occupation" of the island, I would like to recall that the division of the island both territorially and ethnically came about in 1963 as a direct consequence of the Greek Cypriot onslaught on the Turkish Cypriot people. Hence, the creation of the *Green Line* by the British contingent on the island and the arrival of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in 1964. It is also important to remember that the Turkish intervention, which was carried out in accordance with Turkey's rights and obligations under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, did not come about until 1974 and was the direct result of the coup d'état, carried out by the joint Greek-Greek Cypriot front, which aimed to annex the island to Greece and annihilate the Turkish Cypriot people. Contrary to the Greek Cypriot representative's claim, the only occupation in the island is the 38-year-long occupation of the seat of "government of Cyprus" by the Greek Cypriot administration. Furthermore, the Turkish military presence in Northern Cyprus, in accordance with the 1960 international treaties and with the consent of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, is a security requirement for the Turkish Cypriot people against the repetition of Greek Cypriot aggression, particularly in view of the continuing Greek-Greek Cypriot Joint Military Dogma.

The Greek Cypriot representative has paid lip service to "tolerance and multiculturalism" and has tried to accuse the Turkish Cypriot side of presenting "differences in religion and ethnicity, as the *raison d'être* of creating two different states in Cyprus". It is, in fact, the Greek Cypriot mentality, which is shaped by intolerance towards the existence in Cyprus of anything that is of Turkish origin, that makes a settlement on the basis of two states a vital necessity for the Turkish Cypriot side. This intolerance, which took the form of a genocide against the Turkish Cypriot people, as detailed in the Akritas Plan, put into effect in 1963, and the continued imposition of embargoes on the Turkish Cypriot people in all spheres of life by the Greek Cypriot administration, is the *raison d'être* for a confederation formula in Cyprus. Furthermore, contrary to the Greek Cypriot allegation that these "realities" would create a very dangerous precedent in international affairs, I would like to state that it is the denial of these realities that has sustained the Cyprus question and created an unjust situation in the island.

With regard to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights, both in the case of *Loizidou* and the fourth "state application" by the Greek Cypriot administration, I would like to reiterate our position, which was extensively expounded in President Rauf R. Denktaş's letter of 31 May 2001 (A/55/986-S/2001/575) and mine of 27 August 2001 (A/55/1030-S/2001/824) both addressed to you. The Court has based its decisions on political considerations, wrongfully excluding the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus from the proceedings, and considering Turkey, which has no jurisdiction in Northern Cyprus, as the party to the proceedings. The wrong premise naturally led to the wrong conclusions. As regards the Greek Cypriot representative's reference in his statement to the "subordinate local administration", suffice to say that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, established by the Turkish Cypriot people through the exercise of their inherent right to self-determination, is a sovereign and independent State.

Mr. Sotos Zackheos, as representative of the Greek Cypriot administration, an illegal and illegitimate administration that usurped, by force of arms, the title of the "government of Cyprus" and ordered massacres of the Turkish Cypriot people and continues to this day to impose inhuman embargoes on them, has tried to distort the human rights record of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. I would like to remind the Greek Cypriot representative that as documented in the United States State Department's country report on human rights practices in Cyprus, published in February 2000, it is confirmed that human rights are well respected in Northern Cyprus. While also distorting the facts pertaining to the economic and social standards in Northern Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot representative fails to mention the unjustified embargoes ranging from trade and tourism to travel and sports imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people by the Greek Cypriot administration, which has significantly curtailed the development efforts of the Turkish Cypriots since 1963.

It is the Turkish Cypriot side that is interested in finding a just and lasting settlement recognizing the legitimate rights of the Turkish Cypriot people, namely their political equality and sovereignty. The day the Greek Cypriot administration recognizes to the sovereign equality of the Turkish Cypriot side, the Cyprus question will be settled easily.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the support of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for your mission of good offices and to reiterate that the Turkish Cypriot party is ready to engage in a new effort to prepare the ground for meaningful talks, provided that the Greek Cypriot side also shares the same vision of partnership and principles for the future of the island.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 62, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aytuğ Plümer
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
24 October 2001

Original: English

**General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and
the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory****Security Council
Fifty-sixth year****Identical letters dated 24 October 2001 from the Permanent
Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

Today, around midnight (Palestine time), Israeli occupying forces once again entered the area under the full control of the Palestinian Authority and seized the village of Beit Reema to the north of the city of Ramallah, using tanks, armoured personnel carriers, helicopter gunships and bulldozers. The Israeli forces killed a number of Palestinians, injured many others, destroyed some homes and abducted several individuals. The exact numbers of those killed, injured and abducted remains unclear at this time because the Israeli occupying forces have cordoned off the village, even preventing ambulances from coming in to treat the victims of this deadly night assault. This additional Israeli war crime and act of State terrorism has been committed despite all the calls for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from the areas that it has recently reoccupied.

In this regard, as the illegal Israeli seizure and partial reoccupation of six Palestinian cities in the West Bank continues, the Israeli occupying forces continue to carry out the bloody military campaign against the Palestinian people, causing more deaths and injuries and the spread of more terror and fear throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem. Today, Israeli occupying forces pushed deeper into the city of Tulkarem, killing three Palestinians with tank fire. A fourth Palestinian man was killed in Abu Dis near Jerusalem and a fifth Palestinian was killed in Bethlehem.

Further, on Monday, 22 October 2001, Israel, the occupying Power, committed yet another assassination of a Palestinian man. In that attack, Mr. Ayman Abu Al-Halaweh was killed by a car bomb near the town of Nablus. On that same day, the occupying forces killed two other Palestinian civilians. Three Palestinian men were also killed by Israeli tank fire yesterday, 23 October, in the city of Tulkarem.

This continuous and widespread Israeli military assault against the Palestinian people and the Palestinian Authority, including the Israeli military reoccupation of several Palestinian towns and cities, has further inflamed the already tense, unstable and grave situation on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. These



serious developments in Israel's bloody military campaign have drastically undermined recent efforts aimed at bringing a halt to the violence and deterioration of the situation on the ground and at resuming negotiations between the two sides.

The situation should be a matter of great concern for the international community, and all efforts must be made to ensure the full and immediate withdrawal of Israeli occupying forces from areas reoccupied and to bring an end to the Israeli military campaign being waged against the Palestinian people. The Security Council has a clear responsibility in this regard under the Charter of the United Nations, and we believe it must act immediately.

I write this letter to you in follow-up of our previous 75 letters regarding the grave situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, dated from 29 September 2000 to 22 October 2001 (A/55/432-S/2000/921; A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605; A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629; A/ES-10/93-S/2001/657; A/ES-10/94-S/2001/669; A/ES-10/95-S/2001/686; A/ES-10/96-S/2001/697; A/ES-10/97-S/2001/708; A/ES-10/98-S/2001/717; A/ES-10/99-S/2001/742; A/ES-10/100-S/2001/754; A/ES-10/101-S/2001/783; A/ES-10/102-S/2001/785; A/ES-10/103-S/2001/798; A/ES-10/104-S/2001/812; A/ES-10/105-S/2001/814; A/ES-10/107-S/2001/821; A/ES-10/108-S/2001/826; A/ES-10/111-S/2001/880; A/ES-10/112-S/2001/918; A/ES-10/114-S/2001/928; A/ES-10/115-S/2001/932; A/ES-10/116-S/2001/941; A/ES-10/117-S/2001/971; A/ES-10/118-S/2001/989 and A/ES-10/119-S/2001/991). Since my letter to you on 22 October 2001, many more Palestinians have been killed by the Israeli occupying forces. As of yesterday, the killing of the 6 Palestinians mentioned above raised the total number of Palestinian martyrs to 713 people. That number is sadly dramatically higher today as a result of the Israeli assaults on Beit Rima, Tulkarem, Abu Dis and Bethlehem. (The names of the martyrs that have been identified are contained in the annex to the present letter.)

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as an official document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nasser Al-Kidwa
Ambassador

Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

Annex to the identical letters dated 24 October 2001 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem^a (Monday, 22 October 2001 and Tuesday, 23 October 2001)

Monday, 22 October 2001

1. Nidal Taleb Alyan
2. Yussef Al-Shalaby
3. Ayman Adnan Abu Al-Halaweh

Tuesday, 23 October 2001

1. Talat Atwa Jabir
 2. Bader Mohammed Ahmed Al-Sha'er
 3. Nasser Hani Kar'an
-

^a The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 713.

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
24 October 2001

Original: English

**Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation
in Abkhazia, Georgia****I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1364 (2001) of 31 July 2001, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) until 31 January 2002 and requested me to report three months from the date of the adoption of the resolution. The present report provides an update on developments in Abkhazia, Georgia, since my report of 19 July 2001 (S/2001/713).

2. My Special Representative for Georgia, Dieter Boden, continues to head UNOMIG. He is assisted in his task by the Chief Military Observer, Major General Anis Ahmed Bajwa (Pakistan). The strength of UNOMIG on 20 October stood at 104 military observers (see annex).

II. Political process

3. The shooting down of a United Nations MI-8 helicopter on 8 October in the Gulripsh district of Abkhazia, Georgia, with nine unarmed people on board, including four UNOMIG military observers on their way to resume patrolling in the upper Kodori Valley, marked a new low point in the situation, which had been deteriorating over the past six months.

4. Both sides have contributed to the present deplorable state of affairs. They have neglected essential political work within the mechanisms of the Geneva peace process, particularly the Coordinating Council; disregarded the implementation of agreed protocols; and failed to contain a situation with a clear potential for armed clashes. Since direct political

contacts between the two sides have been reduced to a minimum, the efforts since mid-August of my Special Representative and Chief Military Observer have focused on crisis management rather than on the promotion of a political settlement. My Special Representative is currently attempting through high-level political contacts with the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to re-establish dialogue between them and revitalize the existing negotiating mechanisms.

5. Following the request of the Security Council, in its resolution 1364 (2001), to be kept informed of the progress towards a political settlement, including the status of the draft paper on distribution of competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, my Special Representative has continued consultations with the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General to reach agreement on the draft text. In early August, the Russian Federation presented new proposals for the draft paper, suggesting, in particular, that security guarantees be included. Subsequently, my Special Representative and the Group of Friends conducted a series of meetings in New York, Moscow and Tbilisi. In an effort to find an acceptable compromise, the suggestion was made to deal with security guarantees on a parallel track, based on the provisions contained in the Yalta Declaration of March 2001 (see S/2001/242), but not to include this matter in the draft paper. Unfortunately, the Group of Friends has not been able so far to reach agreement on a paper that could be presented to the parties as a basis for negotiations on the future status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia.

6. In a letter dated 1 August and addressed to me, the Abkhaz de facto Prime Minister, Anri Jergenja, repeated the Abkhaz leadership's refusal to participate



in any negotiations on the basis of the paper, and expressed the view that "state-legal relations" between Abkhazia and Georgia were already broken off when the former USSR still existed.

7. The thirteenth session of the Coordinating Council, scheduled to take place in Tbilisi on 9 October, had to be postponed for the third time by my Special Representative, due to insufficient political will on either side to engage in serious dialogue within the available peace process mechanisms and an increasing tendency to hold the peace process hostage to political demands. The implementation of agreed projects, in particular those based on the Yalta Programme for Action in Confidence-Building and on the recommendations of the Joint Assessment Mission to Gali, has practically come to a standstill. Nevertheless, the parties continued some preparatory work within the framework of the Coordinating Council: on 11 September, the Council's Working Group I (on security matters) met (see para. 15 below); on 20 September, the Ministers of Education of both sides jointly visited the Gali district (see para. 38 below); and on 24 September, a meeting with Georgian and Abkhaz participation took place to follow up on the November 2000 Joint Assessment Mission to the Gali district (see para. 38 below).

8. On 18 October, Abkhaz de facto Prime Minister Jergenia suggested publicly a closer association for Abkhazia with the Russian Federation. However, Russian officials at the highest level reaffirmed their commitment to the territorial integrity of Georgia. The Georgian Parliament, on 11 October, adopted a resolution to replace the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with an international peacekeeping mission, without specifying its modalities.

III. Operations of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia

9. During the period under review, the conflict zone remained tense and unstable. UNOMIG continued its patrols throughout the mission area, except the Georgian-controlled upper part of the Kodori Valley. These patrols are conducted from UNOMIG headquarters in Sukhumi and sector headquarters in Gali and Zugdidi. The sectors also carried out helicopter patrols over their areas of responsibility,

with special attention to inaccessible areas and the security zone along the ceasefire line. One joint helicopter patrol and one joint ground patrol, composed of UNOMIG, the CIS peacekeeping force, and Georgian and Abkhaz authorities, were also conducted. For security reasons, patrolling was at times suspended in parts of the area of responsibility. The account of the fighting in and around the lower Kodori Valley (see paras. 13-25 below) is, therefore, based on reports from the two sides and the CIS peacekeeping force, which have not been independently verified by UNOMIG.

10. UNOMIG liaised with governmental and non-governmental structures in Tbilisi, Sukhumi, Zugdidi and Gali to coordinate its operational and administrative activities. Within the area of responsibility, UNOMIG coordinated with the CIS peacekeeping force and urged local law enforcement agencies to take additional precautionary measures to prevent an increase in criminal activities during the hazelnut harvest season. In response, the CIS peacekeeping force increased its patrols in the Gali district. The completion of repair work on a number of bridges and roads throughout the UNOMIG area of operation during the period under review significantly improved UNOMIG operational capability.

11. On 14 August, following tensions caused by abductions and counter-abductions in the months of July and August, both sides held an extraordinary meeting at the ministerial level, under the chairmanship of my Special Representative, on the ceasefire line. The parties agreed to locate, take into protective custody and return the abducted persons, and to combat illegal activities in the security zone. Two days later, the first hostages were released.

12. During the reporting period, the Georgian and Abkhaz sides increased their cooperation within the Joint Fact-Finding Group, and the participation of all parties in the Group's investigations markedly improved. The Group conducted eight investigations, including four new ones, and held 10 meetings. It also carried out two joint helicopter patrols and a joint ground patrol to verify the presence of irregular armed groups on the Georgian-controlled side of the ceasefire line.

13. The first serious threats to stability in the conflict zone developed on 18 and 19 August, when clashes between armed irregulars and Abkhaz security forces near the upper Kodori Valley, but outside of

UNOMIG's area of responsibility, resulted in the death of four irregulars. According to local authorities in Tbilisi, the Abkhaz forces used two helicopters and a jet aircraft in the fighting. This led to Georgian accusations of Russian involvement since, according to Tbilisi, the Abkhaz military does not have the particular type of aircraft used.

14. On 22 August, the Abkhaz de facto Prime Minister claimed that armed irregular groups totalling 700 men, had gathered close to the ceasefire line in the northern part of UNOMIG's area of responsibility, preparing to invade. It had become clear at that point that the groups were on Georgian-controlled territory and had assembled without interference by the authorities. The Abkhaz authorities ordered a partial mobilization of the army and reservists. In order to de-escalate the situation, UNOMIG's Chief Military Observer conducted a series of meetings with top-level officials in Tbilisi and Sukhumi and received assurances that the Georgian side would prevent armed groups from crossing the ceasefire line. He also facilitated a meeting between the Abkhaz de facto Prime Minister and the Georgian Minister for Special Assignments in Sukhumi on 24 August, at which it was agreed not to allow any military operations on either side. Direct telephone contact between the Abkhaz de facto Prime Minister and the President of Georgia followed, which defused the tension and the situation began to de-escalate. Subsequently, the armed irregulars appeared to withdraw from the area and the Abkhaz authorities called off the partial mobilization. The Abkhaz side also expressed its readiness to return to the Coordinating Council, which it had refused to attend following the killings and kidnappings of 8 and 9 July (see S/2001/713, para. 4).

15. In the context of these developments, the eighth session of Working Group I of the Coordinating Council, dealing with security matters, convened on 11 September in Tbilisi. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to the 1994 Moscow Agreement and recommended the following: UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force should resume regular patrols in the Kodori Valley, in accordance with the 1994 Moscow Agreement; UNOMIG medical personnel should be granted immediate access to independently examine bodies when there is a suspicion of a summary execution during detention; the Georgian side should report on progress in criminal proceedings against the persons handed over to them by the Abkhaz authorities

on 11 May 2001 (see S/2001/713, para. 3); both sides should undertake measures to locate people who are still missing according to the protocol of 14 August (see para. 11 above); and both sides would exchange information, in writing, about cases to be investigated by the Joint Fact-Finding Group during the weekly quadripartite meetings.

16. The situation began to worsen again in the second week of September as Georgian armed irregulars, together with fighters from the North Caucasus, predominantly of Chechen origin, moved closer to the upper Kodori Valley. On 20 September, the Abkhaz side informed UNOMIG that, despite assurances to the contrary by the Georgian authorities, there were up to 450 fighters present in or near the Georgian-controlled upper part of the valley. At the same time, the Georgian authorities informed UNOMIG of the movement of three Abkhaz armoured vehicles to the Abkhaz-controlled lower part of the Kodori Valley. A special UNOMIG helicopter patrol confirmed the presence of a field howitzer and two armoured personnel carriers at the Abkhaz checkpoint. On 28 September, in a private meeting in Tbilisi facilitated by UNOMIG, Georgian President Shevardnadze and Abkhaz de facto Prime Minister Jergenia agreed to take steps to avert new fighting in and around the Kodori Valley. The Georgian side reportedly pledged to undertake measures to disperse the armed irregulars and the Abkhaz side committed itself to exercise restraint in dealing with these groups, unless they engaged in criminal or unlawful activities. Mr. Jergenia, while in Tbilisi, also appealed to the Group of Friends to help prevent new hostilities and provide security guarantees as requested in the Yalta Declaration of March 2001 (see S/2001/401).

17. In order for UNOMIG to be able to carry out its mandate fully, my Special Representative repeatedly urged Georgian officials to provide the necessary security guarantees for the resumption of UNOMIG patrolling in the Georgian-controlled upper Kodori Valley.

18. Despite the undertakings of 28 September, new signs of a major crisis became evident on 3 and 4 October, when a sizeable group of armed irregulars attacked an Abkhaz checkpoint in the village of Georgievskoe in the Abkhaz-controlled lower Kodori Valley. In a counter attack on the next day, the Abkhaz forces repulsed the irregulars and claimed to have driven them into the mountains to the north. One

Abkhaz soldier and four civilians were killed, with five more people reported missing. These armed irregulars reportedly belonged to the same group that was present in the upper Kodori Valley in September (see para. 16 above). Immediately, my Special Representative and the Chief Military Observer held a series of meetings with senior government officials in Tbilisi aimed at halting the new escalation of violence.

19. On 6 October, unknown armed irregulars attacked the Abkhaz security post in Tagiloni, near the ceasefire line, using automatic fire and rocket-propelled grenades. After the attack the assailants fled to the Georgian-controlled side of the ceasefire line. No casualties were reported.

20. On the basis of security assurances provided by Georgia on 6 October and following clearance of the flight by the Abkhaz authorities as well as their assurances that the irregulars had been driven northwards, a UNOMIG helicopter patrol to the Kodori Valley was launched on 8 October. Shortly after it took off, the helicopter was shot down close to the entrance of the valley, 20 kilometres east of Sukhumi, killing all nine unarmed people on board, including four United Nations military observers, two locally employed United Nations staff members and all three members of the contracted helicopter crew. This is the most serious security incident in the history of UNOMIG. On the same day, a UNOMIG search and rescue patrol, with an armed escort of the CIS peacekeeping force, recovered five bodies. However, because of continued fighting near the crash site, the four remaining bodies could only be recovered two days later by the Abkhaz military. A team from United Nations Headquarters was sent immediately to Sukhumi to assist in the technical investigation of the crash and to provide administrative support to UNOMIG. A technical investigation committee has been set up under the chairmanship of Ukraine (the country of registration of the helicopter), with the participation of the United Nations and in cooperation with Georgian and Abkhaz authorities. The Council was briefed twice about the incident.

21. Following the shooting down of the United Nations helicopter, my Special Representative immediately travelled to Sukhumi Headquarters to oversee the rescue efforts and to meet with the Abkhaz leadership. On 9 October, he urged Mr. Jergenia to exercise restraint and not allow the fighting to spread into the upper Kodori Valley, which the Abkhaz had

earlier threatened. The Abkhaz de facto Prime Minister agreed to meet with President Shevardnadze on the condition that the only issue to be addressed would be the de-escalation of the situation on the ground and the end of the ongoing fighting.

22. However, fighting continued between Abkhaz forces and armed irregulars in the lower Kodori Valley and, at times, near the main road along the coast and close to Sukhumi. Twelve local residents were killed in the village of Naa (lower Kodori), close to the site where the UNOMIG helicopter went down, which was temporarily occupied by a group of armed irregulars. On 9 October, two unidentified fighter aircraft carried out attacks on the villages of Georgievskoe and Chiena in the Abkhaz-controlled lower Kodori Valley and, later, two other aircraft bombed the village of Omarishara in the Georgian-controlled upper Kodori Valley. On 11 October, the Abkhaz side used artillery and airpower during a sweep operation to drive the armed irregulars out of the lower valley. On 17 October, the Abkhaz side was once again reported to have used helicopters and planes, this time more extensively, against retreating irregulars about 10 kilometres short of the border with the Russian Federation. The Georgian side again voiced suspicion about Russian involvement (see para. 13 above).

23. My Special Representative met with President Shevardnadze on 11 October and urged him to meet with the Abkhaz de facto Prime Minister to avoid larger-scale hostilities. At the time of writing of the present report, no reply to this suggestion had been received. My Special Representative also urged the Georgian side not to send reinforcements or supplies into the area of fighting. Since 9 October, due to the precarious security conditions on the ground, UNOMIG's Sukhumi headquarters and Gali sector have been placed on a state of alert. Operational patrolling from these sectors was suspended and only resumed on 18 October 2001, after the fighting died down. However, patrolling activity in the Zugdidi sector has continued without change.

24. Starting 11 October, the fighting in the lower Kodori Valley decreased in intensity. By 18 October, it had largely ended. Estimates of casualties, in addition to the civilians and United Nations staff, indicate that about 60 armed elements and about 16 Abkhaz troops were killed; some 10 irregulars were taken prisoner by Abkhaz forces.

25. Since early October, there have also been sporadic individual shooting incidents in the Gali region, in addition to the incident in Tagiloni (see para. 19 above). My Special Representative, as well as the Chief Military Observer, have remained in constant contact with the Abkhaz and Georgian authorities in order to reduce tensions and ensure respect for the ceasefire.

IV. Security situation

26. Levels of crime and lawlessness remained high in the zone of conflict, creating an overall sense of insecurity and uncertainty among the local population. Local law enforcement agencies were unable to control crime in the conflict zone. Numerous incidents were reported in both the Gali and Zugdidi sectors. However, the rate was higher on the Abkhaz-controlled side of the ceasefire line, especially in lower Gali. In some areas on the Abkhaz-controlled side of the ceasefire line, joint patrolling by Abkhaz militia, local residents and the CIS peacekeeping force helped to reduce the level of lawlessness. Similarly, on the Georgian side of the ceasefire line, joint patrolling by Georgian police, local residents and the CIS peacekeeping force led to a reduction in criminal incidents. UNOMIG security officers conducted regular patrols to reduce the risk of security incidents and closely liaised with the Zugdidi police and Gali militia.

27. In the Gali sector, four residences of local United Nations employees were robbed and four more robbery attempts took place. UNOMIG patrols in the Gali sector received threats from the Abkhaz military and militia posts. Abkhaz authorities in Sukhumi took measures to stop such threats.

28. In the Zugdidi sector, the houses of three UNOMIG local employees were robbed. Four protest demonstrations by internally displaced persons and locals who established roadblocks impeded UNOMIG movement and patrolling activities. The Georgian local authorities, however, took swift action to disband the demonstrations and remove the obstacles on the road.

29. The arrival of seven new mine-protected vehicles is expected to significantly improve the security of the military observers while on patrol.

V. Cooperation with the collective peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States

30. During the reporting period, UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force continued their close cooperation. CIS peacekeeping units escorted UNOMIG patrol teams, participated in joint investigations and patrolling, and cooperated in efforts to defuse tense situations. The CIS peacekeeping force actively collaborated during the weekly quadripartite meetings and the eighth session of Working Group I of the Coordinating Council. However, cooperation could be strengthened further, particularly as regards the exchange of information.

31. The possible consequences for UNOMIG of the 11 October resolution of the Georgian Parliament (see para. 8 above) will have to be carefully assessed.

VI. Humanitarian situation and human rights

32. During the reporting period, international humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) continued programmes to meet the acute needs of the most vulnerable in Abkhazia, Georgia. However, due to the fighting in the Kodori Valley area and the volatile situation in Gali, many NGOs suspended their activities after 8 October.

33. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expanded its school rehabilitation programme to 22 schools in the Gali district, 12 in upper Gali and 10 in lower Gali, as well as three schools in Ochamchira district on a "self-help" basis. UNHCR provided material and village communities contributed their labour. However, UNHCR still could not operate in more remote and dangerous areas, such as Primorsk, where humanitarian needs were particularly urgent and only UNOMIG patrols had access. My Special Representative is preparing a proposal for limited relief projects in such areas, where the need is great but humanitarian agencies cannot operate, to be implemented with funds provided to UNOMIG.

34. United Nations Volunteers resumed programmes to develop the capacity of local NGOs.

35. The International Committee of the Red Cross continued to distribute food to vulnerable parts of the population and worked on rehabilitating the water and sanitation systems in Sukhumi and Ochamchira. Médecins sans frontières expanded its tuberculosis treatment and health access programme with mobile teams. The British HALO Trust's mine clearance and mine awareness operations continued from three operational bases in Sukhumi, Ochamchira and Gali.

36. International non-governmental organizations continued to be hampered by restrictions on border crossings between Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Russian Federation at the Psou River. This complicated the provision of assistance and the planning of emergency evacuations (see S/2001/713, para. 26).

37. There was little evidence of an improvement in the field of human rights in Abkhazia, Georgia. Widespread organized crime, lack of effective law enforcement and continuing stalemate regarding the language policy in schools in the predominantly Georgian-speaking Gali district affected the return of displaced persons and remained of major concern to the United Nations Human Rights Office. Reports of human rights violations included harassment on ethnic and religious grounds, violations of fair trial standards, and arbitrary and illegal detentions. Law enforcement agencies failed to conduct prompt, impartial and full investigation and prosecution. During the review period, the human rights office handled individual complaints, and monitored court sessions and detention facilities in police stations because of increasing concerns about inhumane treatment or health conditions of detainees.

38. As a follow-up to the Joint Assessment Mission to the Gali district, conducted in November 2000, on 24 September the Georgian and Abkhaz representatives and participants of the Mission explored ways for the practical implementation of recommendations set forth in the Joint Assessment Mission Report (see S/2001/59, annex II) and agreed to a number of recommendations for the Coordinating Council. The meeting gave specific attention to progress in the return of displaced persons to the Gali district, human rights, public security and language of instruction. The issue of the language of instruction in the Gali district was also taken up during a visit to the Gali region on 20 September by the Georgian and Abkhaz Ministers of Education, who agreed to continue their efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution.

VII. Observations

39. The fighting in the Kodori Valley and surrounding areas of Abkhazia, Georgia, as well as the shooting down of a UNOMIG helicopter on 8 October, represent a serious deterioration of the situation and a setback in efforts to achieve a political settlement. Both sides must unequivocally respect the ceasefire, renew their commitment to seek a resolution of the conflict by political means, stop encouraging any military action and return to the peace process without reservation or procrastination.

40. The shooting down of a helicopter with unarmed UNOMIG personnel on board is an outrage. It raises serious questions about the failure of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to ensure the security of United Nations personnel. I remind both sides of their obligation to provide for the safety and security of United Nations personnel — the cornerstone of any United Nations involvement — and to move it to the top of their list of priorities. The perpetrators of criminal acts targeted against UNOMIG must be brought to justice.

41. The latest events are a painful demonstration of the fact that, in the absence of meaningful negotiations on the future political status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia, the entire peace process can be jeopardized. I appeal again to the Group of Friends to expedite, in close cooperation with my Special Representative, the process of finalizing the draft paper on the distribution of competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi and to bring it to a successful conclusion. Moreover, in light of recent events, I urge the Abkhaz side to review its position and, following the finalization of the text, to join efforts to proceed with negotiations on the basis of the draft paper.

42. During the reporting period, the parties have neglected active work within the Geneva peace process mechanisms. The cancellation, on three occasions, of the Coordinating Council over the last six months — twice at the request of the Abkhaz side — threatens to defeat the purpose of this negotiating forum. Both sides should be aware that these mechanisms are established to serve their own security, especially in times of crisis. They should, therefore, return immediately to full-fledged participation in the Coordinating Council and all its working groups.

43. Regrettably, there has again been no progress on the issue of facilitating the safe, secure and dignified

return of the refugees and internally displaced persons to their places of previous permanent residence. Meanwhile, the spontaneous resettlement of internally displaced persons to the Gali district has continued under precarious conditions. I call upon both sides to resume serious work on this matter on the basis of existing agreements, including the Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, signed on 4 April 1994. In addition, the implementation of the recommendations set forth in the report of the Joint Assessment Mission to the Gali district of November 2000 (see S/2001/59, annex II) is more pressing than ever. Both sides should immediately take up these matters in a cooperative spirit.

44. Notwithstanding the promising confidence-building measures included in the Yalta Programme of Action of March 2001 and its annex, concrete work on these measures has come to a standstill. Instead there has been renewed fighting. I invite the parties to recognize the critical need for action in this area, to resume efforts aimed at implementing the Yalta Programme in all its aspects, and to stop linking confidence-building measures to security issues.

45. Given the current tense situation, both sides should be reminded that they must comply with all provisions of the Moscow Agreement, the protocols agreed within the Coordinating Council framework and the commitments made during the weekly quadripartite meetings. Their failure to implement these arrangements has contributed to the current crisis. The Georgian side, in particular, should be reminded to curb the activities of irregular armed groups operating in and from the areas under its control. It is these activities which have led to the serious destabilization of the situation in the conflict area.

46. At a time when we still mourn the death of nine of our colleagues in UNOMIG, I wish to express my appreciation and admiration to the women and men of the Mission for the steadfastness and courage they continue to display in carrying out their mandated tasks and in pursuing the cause of peace in Abkhazia, Georgia, despite very difficult and dangerous circumstances.

Annex

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia: contributions as at 20 October 2001

<i>Country</i>	<i>Military observer</i>
Albania	1
Austria	2
Bangladesh	7
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	5
Egypt	3
France	3
Germany	10
Greece	4
Hungary	7
Indonesia	4
Jordan	6
Pakistan	7 ^a
Poland	4
Republic of Korea	5
Russian Federation	3
Sweden	5
Switzerland	3
Turkey	5
Ukraine	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7
Uruguay	3
United States of America	2
Total	104

^a Including the Chief Military Observer.

**Security Council**

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25 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 24 October 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1374 (2001), adopted by the Council on 19 October 2001, in which the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against the União Nacional Para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) established pursuant to Council resolution 1295 (2000) was extended for a further period of six months, ending on 19 April 2002. In paragraph 7 of that resolution, the Council requested, after consultation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993), concerning the situation in Angola, that I appoint four experts to serve on the Monitoring Mechanism.

Accordingly, and having consulted with the Committee, I wish to inform you that I have appointed the following four experts:

Ms. Christine Gordon (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Mr. Wilson Chisala Kalumba (Zambia)

Ambassador Juan Larrain (Chile)

Mr. Ismaila Seck (Senegal)

I have also requested Ambassador Juan Larrain (Chile) to continue to chair the Monitoring Mechanism.

(Signed) Kofi A. Annan



**Security Council**

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Identical letters dated 23 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that Turkish forces have embarked on a new series of acts of aggression against Iraqi territory, as follows:

1. On 5 October 2001, Turkish forces consisting of some 25 to 30 tanks accompanied by 45 to 60 military trucks carrying materiel and troops entered northern Iraq, taking the road through Zakho, Dakkar, Ajam, Batufah, Baykufah, Kani Masi, Bamarni and Ikmala. Some of these forces halted in the Kani Masi, Baykufah and Ikmala areas and the rest headed towards Jabal Karah.
2. Concentrations of Turkish forces were seen in the Shamandli Turkish border area, and it appears that these forces are preparing to enter Iraqi territory in the area of the Iraq-Turkey-Iran tripoint.
3. On 6 October 2001, three or four military trucks carrying Turkish troops entered northern Iraq.
4. On 9 October 2001, 25 to 30 Turkish military vehicles carrying troops and equipment entered Iraqi territory coming from the Wardah area towards the Sanat area. At the same time other Turkish forces entered Iraqi territory by way of the Ibrahim al-Khalil area from Silopi heading towards the Kani Masi, Bamarni and Amadiyah areas. Turkish military forces are now reinforcing their positions and fortifying them in order to maintain the thrust of the new incursion into Iraqi territory in the north.

This new Turkish incursion into Iraq's northern territories is part of a series of hostile operations and of the flagrant violations being committed by Turkish armed forces against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq. These actions confirm the duplicitous policy being pursued by Turkey with regard to the anomalous situation in northern Iraq that it helped to create and perpetuate, an act of blatant interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. Turkey's claim that it is in pursuit of elements that pose a threat to its national security cannot legitimize its assaults on Iraq's sovereignty, and the correct way to safeguard the security of Turkey's southern borders is to end the anomalous situation obtaining in northern Iraq and respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq condemns and deplores in the strongest terms the ongoing violation of Iraq's territory and airspace in the north by



Turkish armed forces. This is in breach of the principles of good-neighbourliness and the norms embodied in international law and the Charter of the United Nations as well as of the appeals of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Most recently, the participants in the Thirteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement, held in Colombia in April 2000, stated in the final document of the conference (A/54/917-S/2000/580, para. 137):

"We strongly condemn the repeated actions of Turkish armed forces violating the territorial integrity of Iraq under the pretext of fighting guerrilla elements hiding inside Iraqi territory. These actions of Turkish armed forces constitute stark illegal violations of the international boundaries mutually recognized between the two countries and a threat to regional and international peace and security. We also reject the so-called 'hot-pursuit' measures adopted by Turkey to justify such actions that are abhorrent to international law and to the norms of practice among States."

We call upon Turkey to desist forthwith from these hostile practices and to withdraw its invading forces from Iraqi territory without delay, and we urge it to refrain from any repetition of these hostile acts. We affirm that the Government of Iraq reserves in full its legitimate right to defend itself, and we consider that Turkey bears full responsibility under international law for the consequences of its ongoing aggression, its violations of Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and airspace and its exposure of Iraq's security and safety to grave risks.

We hope that the United Nations will fulfil its responsibilities, that it will urge the Turkish Government to comply with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law by ceasing forthwith its military aggression and its blatant interference in Iraq's internal affairs and by immediately withdrawing its armed forces from Iraq's territory. We further hope that it will hold Turkey legally responsible for this aggression.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Mohammed A. Aldouri**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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**General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international
terrorism****Security Council
Fifty-sixth year****Letter dated 24 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative
of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I wish to draw your attention to the latest incident of Palestinian terrorism directed against Israel.

Just before 11 a.m. (local time) on the morning of 22 October 2001, Yousef Muhammad Ayash, an automobile mechanic from the Palestinian-controlled village of Artis, shot and seriously wounded his former employer at a garage in the Jerusalem neighbourhood of Talpiot. Ayash then ran into the street where he wounded three others before being shot by an Israeli soldier who happened to be in the vicinity. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.

Yesterday's attack is the latest in an ongoing campaign of Palestinian terrorism that has been detailed in my letters dated 19 October 2001 (A/56/492-S/2001/990), 17 October 2001 (A/56/483-S/2001/975), 8 October 2001 (A/56/450-S/2001/948), 5 October 2001 (A/56/444-S/2001/943), 3 October 2001 (A/56/438-S/2001/938), 24 September 2001 (A/56/406-S/2001/907), 20 September 2001 (A/56/386-S/2001/892), 17 September 2001 (A/56/367-S/2001/875), 7 September 2001 (A/56/346-S/2001/858), 4 September 2001 (A/56/331-S/2001/840), 30 August 2001 (A/56/325-S/2001/834), 27 August 2001 (A/56/324-S/2001/825), 13 August 2001 (A/56/294-S/2001/787), 9 August 2001 (A/56/286-S/2001/780), 8 August 2001 (A/56/280-S/2001/775), 6 August 2001 (A/56/272-S/2001/768), 27 July 2001 (A/56/225-S/2001/743), 26 July 2001 (A/56/223-S/2001/737), 17 July 2001 (A/56/201-S/2001/706), 13 July 2001 (A/56/184-S/2001/696), 3 July 2001 (A/56/138-S/2001/662), 2 July 2001 (A/56/131-S/2001/656), 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-



S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108) and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

The Government of Israel holds the Palestinian Authority responsible for this latest attack in light of its continuing role in orchestrating and inciting a campaign of violence and terrorism against Israel and its citizens and its refusal to bring the perpetrators of such acts to justice. This campaign, which is being conducted in grave and flagrant violation of signed commitments reached between Israel and the Palestinian leadership, and which represents a dangerous departure from the spirit and the letter of the Middle East peace process, is the direct result of the relentless incitement in the official Palestinian media, the collusion between the Palestinian leadership and recognized terrorist groups, and the release of scores of terrorists from Palestinian prisons.

At the same time as the international community mobilizes its resources in the fight against terror, the Palestinian leadership continues to support and harbour terrorists in its territory even while it persists in paying lip service to the global effort to eradicate terrorism. Israel calls on the Palestinian leadership to adhere to its obligations to renounce the use of violence and terrorism, to control and punish all Palestinian elements that continue to engage in such practices, and to bring its actions into accord with its written and verbal commitments to fight terrorism emanating from the territory under its control. Israel further calls on the international community, in the context of its global campaign against terrorism, to exert maximum pressure on all States and entities that support terrorism or are actively engaged in terrorist operations.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Lincry
Permanent Representative

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**General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international
terrorism****Security Council
Fifty-sixth year****Letter dated 24 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative
of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

I wish to draw your attention to the latest incident to imperil peace and security along Israel's northern border.

On 22 October 2001, in an unprovoked cross-border attack, Hizbullah terrorists, for the second time in three weeks, launched dozens of mortars and anti-tank shells at Israeli positions in the Mount Dov region.

This attack represents the latest violation of the Blue Line as established by the United Nations and, as such, constitutes a grave threat to peace and security along the border and in the region as a whole. Earlier violations have been detailed in my letters dated 5 October 2001 (A/56/443-S/2001/942), 6 July 2001 (A/56/161-S/2001/673), 16 April 2001 (S/2001/367), 16 February 2001 (A/55/792-S/2001/142), 6 February 2001 (A/55/767-S/2001/111), 26 November 2000 (S/2000/1121), 23 October 2000 (S/2000/1011), 19 October 2000 (S/2000/1002) and 7 October 2000 (S/2000/969).

Despite Israel's full and confirmed compliance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978), Hizbullah, with the assistance of both the Lebanese and Syrian Governments, continues to launch attacks against Israel across the Blue Line. These attacks violate basic norms of international law, most recently reaffirmed by Council resolution 1373 (2001), which obligates all States to prevent their territory from serving as a base for terrorist operations. These attacks further violate the provisions of Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1310 (2000) and 1337 (2001) — which call for the restoration of international peace and security, the return of the effective authority and presence of the Government of Lebanon in the south, and respect for the integrity of the Blue Line as determined by the Secretary-General and endorsed by the Council.

The continuation of unprovoked cross-border attacks on Israeli territory is due not only to Lebanon's failure to fulfil its international obligations, but to the ongoing support of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic for Hizbullah's terrorist operations. The Syrian Government, a recognized State sponsor of



terrorism, continues to permit overland arms transfers to pass through Syrian territory from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Hizbullah's operatives, allows Hizbullah to maintain terrorist training facilities in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley, and grants its terrorists safe harbour in Syrian territory. Moreover, by providing financial, political and organizational assistance, the Syrian Arab Republic has directly enhanced the capability of the organization to launch attacks against Israel, in blatant violation of established legal norms, including the recently adopted Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).

In light of the renewed global commitment to eradicating the scourge of terrorism, it is intolerable that Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic continue to flout the will of the international community by harbouring and assisting terrorists in their territory. The international community must act with full understanding of the fact that terrorism will continue to jeopardize peace and security so long as States provide the financial means and the logistic support necessary to carry out attacks.

Israel calls on the Governments of the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon to abide scrupulously by their obligations under Security Council resolutions to refrain from providing any kind of support, whether active or tacit, to persons or entities involved in terrorist attacks. Israel further calls on the Government of Lebanon to fulfil its obligations under international law and relevant Council resolutions to respect the integrity of the Blue Line, deploy its forces up to and along the Blue Line, and act to restore international peace and security in the area. Finally, Israel calls on the international community to bring its full power to bear in an effort to compel these States to end their support for terrorism.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yehuda Lancry
Permanent Representative



Security Council

Distr.: General
25 October 2001

Original: English

Letter dated 25 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the following communications:

- A letter dated 23 October 2001 from Dr. N. C. Dlamini Zuma, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, informing of South Africa's intention to deploy security personnel to Burundi in support of the Arusha peace process (see annex);
- A letter dated 22 October 2001 from President Buyoya to President Mbeki, requesting South Africa to make available protection for the political leaders returning from exile (see enclosure).

I should be grateful if you could have the present letter and its annex and enclosure circulated as documents of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dumisani S. Kumalo
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 25 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

As you are aware, the Seventeenth Regional Summit on Burundi was held in Pretoria on 11 October 2001. At the Summit, the Facilitator reported that there was agreement between the Government of Burundi and the G7 (seven members of opposition parties) on the legal framework for, and the structure of, the transitional government, the composition of the cabinet, the senate and the transitional national assembly. The Summit participants called for the deployment of an impartial multinational presence within Burundi which will serve as a confidence-building measure in support of the Arusha peace process in general and, in particular, of the imminent inauguration of the interim government in Burundi.

South Africa is one of the countries that were requested to contribute to this multinational presence which will safeguard returning political exiles and assist with the training of an all-Burundian protection unit.

I am attaching a copy of the letter sent by President Pierre Buyoya to President Thabo Mbeki dated 22 October 2001 requesting protection forces to be deployed in Burundi; and we understand that a similar request has been forwarded to the Governments of Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal (see enclosure).

I am therefore pleased to inform you that on 1 November my Government intends to deploy a battalion in Burundi to serve as an interim protection force until an all-Burundian unit has been trained to take over the responsibility. The specific details of the mandate and concept of operations for the protection unit will be communicated separately. We will also keep you updated on our continued efforts to provide assistance to the people of Burundi.

As a result, my Government respectfully requests that the Security Council endorse the deployment of this interim multilateral presence in Burundi.

(Signed) Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Enclosure

[Original: French]

During the Seventeenth Summit of Heads of State held in Pretoria on 11 October 2001, it was agreed that your country could assist the Burundian Government in protecting the political leaders returning from exile.

I hereby should like to request you, on behalf of the Government of Burundi to make protection units available to us.

The President of the Republic of Burundi

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
26 October 2001
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 24 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 23 October 2001 from Mr. Naji Sabri, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq. The Minister calls attention to the ongoing wanton aggression against Iraq by United States and British aircraft in the unlawful no-flight zones and to the fact that in the period from 1 to 11 October 2001 they carried out 165 hostile sorties, 66 of them from Saudi Arabia, 39 from Kuwait and 60 from Turkey, as shown in the statement enclosed with the letter. On 2 October such aircraft fired missiles at an Iraqi site in the south of the country. On 3 October they fired missiles at two Iraqi sites in Basrah Governorate, killing two citizens, wounding a number of Iraqi civilians and destroying many civilian installations.

The Minister reaffirms the Government of Iraq's condemnation of these acts of aggression against Iraqi territory, and he states that international responsibility for them must be borne by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the countries that provide the logistic support for this aggression, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey. He states that Iraq reserves its right, as established by the Charter of the United Nations and international law, to defend itself against this ongoing hostile, terrorist activity. He urges you to perform the duties assigned to you under the Charter by halting this persistent aggression and ensuring that it does not recur and to charge its perpetrators and the regional parties that associate themselves with it with full legal responsibility in its regard.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammed A. Aldouri
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the identical letters dated 24 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

I should like to inform you that the United States of America and the United Kingdom have continued their aerial aggression against Iraq and that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Turkey have also continued to provide logistic facilities for this aggression. United States and British warplanes based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Turkey have thus continued to violate the airspace of the Republic of Iraq. They flew 165 armed sorties in the period from 1 to 11 October 2001, 66 of them from Saudi Arabia, 39 from Kuwait and 60 from Turkey, as shown in the statement enclosed herewith. On 2 October such aircraft fired missiles at an Iraqi site in the south of the country. On 3 October they also fired missiles at two Iraqi sites in Basrah Governorate, killing two citizens, wounding a number of Iraqi civilians and destroying many civilian installations.

The enforcement by the United States and the United Kingdom of the no-flight zones in northern and southern Iraq is an internationally unlawful act and a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the established norms of international law. It constitutes an illegal use of armed force against the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Iraq, and it is to be regarded as an ongoing act of aggression such as accords with the Definition of Aggression approved by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.

Most of the world's countries have condemned the maintenance of the no-flight zones as representing an illegitimate use of force against an independent State. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali has stated that the claim that the Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq authorize the imposition of the no-flight zones is groundless. At his press conference of 27 June 2001, Mr. Kofi A. Annan also affirmed this fact. Nevertheless, the United States and the United Kingdom, with logistic support provided by Turkey and with both logistic support and funding provided by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, are persisting undeterred in their contempt for the Charter of the United Nations and international law and are engaging in this cowardly terrorist aggression against Iraqi civilians and against Iraq's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

The attacks being launched by United States and British aircraft on Iraqi towns and villages and on structures that are basic to life in the country, including health-care and educational establishments and houses of worship, constitute blatant State terrorism that has now been practised for 10 years and has caused the deaths of thousands of Iraqi citizens and left tens of thousands of others injured and has brought about the destruction of vital amenities and infrastructure. That the United Nations, the Security Council and you yourself should remain mere spectators in the presence of this aggression and this blatant State terrorism against Iraq raises serious questions about the credibility of the United Nations and about its capacity to apply the norms of the Charter to all without distinction and without the use of double standards.

The Government of Iraq considers that the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom and the countries that associate themselves with this

terrorist aggression, namely Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, should bear full responsibility for their illegal actions. It affirms Iraq's established right under the Charter of the United Nations and international law to exercise its legitimate right to defend itself against this ongoing hostile, terrorist activity. It further urges you to perform the duties assigned to you as they relate to the maintenance of international peace and security, to call upon the governments of the countries in question to halt their continuing aggression against Iraq and to charge those committing the aggression and the regional parties collaborating with it, namely Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, with full legal responsibility for it.

(Signed) Naji Sabri
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Enclosure**Violations of the airspace of the Republic of Iraq by United States and British warplanes, 1-11 October 2001**

1. In the northern region 60 sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 12,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1205 hours on 1 October 2001, United States and British F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from a base in Turkey and from Turkish airspace penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 14 armed sorties, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Zakho, Irbil, Dohuk, Aqrah, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1430 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1130 hours on 2 October 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Turkey and from Turkish airspace penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 armed sorties, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Dohuk, Amadiyah, Dokan, Irbil, Aqrah and Rawanduz areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1415 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1130 hours on 3 October 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Turkey and from Turkish airspace penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 16 armed sorties, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Amadiyah, Baibo, Zakho, Aqrah, Dohuk, Irbil and Fadiliyah areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1415 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1135 hours on 8 October 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Turkey and from Turkish airspace penetrated Iraq's airspace in the northern region. They carried out 14 armed sorties, were supported by an AWACS aircraft operating inside Turkish airspace and overflew the Irbil, Aqrah, Rawanduz, Dohuk and Amadiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1345 hours, drove them off.

2. In the southern region 105 armed sorties were flown at speeds of 720 to 780 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 9,000 to 13,000 metres, as follows:

(a) At 1455 hours on 2 October 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 11 armed sorties, eight of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and three from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Samawah, Salman, Nasiriyah and Qurnah areas. The United States and British aircraft fired missiles at one of our units in southern Iraq. Our air defences, acting in exercise of

the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1640 hours, drove them off.

(b) At 1425 hours on 3 October 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Saudi and Kuwaiti airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 18 armed sorties, six of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and 12 from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Artawi, Nasiriyah, Basrah, Dayr, Qurnah, Busayyah, Lasaf, Salman and Taqtaqanah areas. The United States and British aircraft fired missiles at two Iraqi sites in Basrah Governorate, killing two citizens, wounding a number of Iraqi civilians and destroying many civilian installations. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1645 hours, drove them off.

(c) At 1705 hours on 4 October 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Saudi and Kuwaiti airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 17 armed sorties, 14 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and three from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Basrah, Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Busayyah, Jalibah, Ashbajah and Shinafiyah areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1830 hours, drove them off.

(d) At 1300 hours on 5 October 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 17 armed sorties, 12 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and five from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Lasaf, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Jalibah and Rifa'i areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1515 hours, drove them off.

(e) At 1345 hours on 6 October 2001, United States and British F-15 and F-16 aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out nine armed sorties from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Jalibah, Busayyah, Salman, Ashbajah and Lasaf areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1535 hours, drove them off.

(f) At 1155 hours on 8 October 2001, United States and British F-15 aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi

airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out two armed sorties from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Jalibah, Salman and Nasiriyah areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1430 hours, drove them off.

(g) At 1445 hours on 9 October 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15 and F-16 aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 15 armed sorties, 10 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and five from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Ashbajah, Salman, Ma'anayah, Lasaf, Artawi, Busayyah, Shinafiyah, Jalibah and Basrah areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1630 hours, drove them off.

(h) At 1328 hours on 10 October 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out 11 armed sorties, 10 of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and one from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Salman, Ashbajah, Ma'anayah and Samawah South areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1440 hours, drove them off.

(i) At 1410 hours on 11 October 2001, United States and British F-14, F-15, F-16, Tornado and EA-6B aircraft coming from bases in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and from Kuwaiti and Saudi airspace and territorial waters penetrated Iraq's airspace in the southern region. They carried out seven armed sorties, six of them from Saudi territory with the support of an AWACS command and control aircraft operating inside Saudi airspace and one from Kuwaiti territory and by way of the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait with the support of an E-2C command and control aircraft operating inside Kuwaiti airspace. They overflew the Busayyah and Salman areas. Our air defences, acting in exercise of the legitimate right to defend the homeland, engaged the aircraft and, at 1625 hours, drove them off.